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Abstract
Increasingly machine learning systems are being deployed to edge servers and
devices (e.g. mobile phones) and trained in a collaborative manner. Such dis-
tributed/federated/decentralized training raises a number of concerns about the
robustness, privacy, and security of the procedure. While extensive work has been
done in tackling with robustness, privacy, or security individually, their combina-
tion has rarely been studied. In this paper, we propose a secure two-server protocol
that offers both input privacy and Byzantine-robustness. In addition, this protocol
is communication-efficient, fault-tolerant and enjoys local differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed fast growth of successful machine learning applications based on data
collected from decentralized user devices. Unfortunately, however, currently most of the important
machine learning models on a societal level do not have their utility, control, and privacy aligned with
the data ownership of the participants. This issue can be partially attributed to a fundamental conflict
between the two leading paradigms of traditional centralized training of models on one hand, and
decentralized/collaborative training schemes on the other hand: While centralized training violates
the privacy rights of participating users, existing alternative training schemes are typically not robust.
Malicious participants can sabotage the training system by feeding it wrong data intentionally, known
as data poisoning. In this paper, we tackle this problem and propose a novel distributed training
algorithm which offers both privacy and robustness.
When applied to datasets containing personal data, the use of privacy-preserving techniques is
currently required under regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The idea of training models on
decentralized datasets and incrementally aggregating model updates via a central server motivates the
federated learning paradigm [24].
However, an honest-but-curious server may still be able to infer a user’s input from its corresponding
model update [41]. To solve this problem, secure aggregation rules as proposed in [7] achieve
guaranteed input privacy. The additive aggregation rule is a simple and efficient case of secure
multi-party computation (MPC), which refers to schemes where multiple parties jointly compute the
output of a function, without revealing their individual inputs. Input privacy here means the server
provably learns nothing more than the function output, which in our case is the sum of all contributed
model updates. Such secure aggregation rules have found wider industry adoption recently e.g. by
Google on Android phones [6, 31] where input privacy guarantees can offer e.g. efficiency and
exactness benefits compared to differential privacy, but both can also be combined.
The concept of Byzantine robustness has received considerable attention in the past few years for
practical applications, as a way to make the training process robust to malicious actors. A Byzantine
participant or worker can behave arbitrarily malicious, e.g. sending arbitrary updates to the server.
This poses great challenge to the most widely used aggregation rules, e.g. simple average, since a
single Byzantine worker can compromise the results of aggregation. A number of Byzantine-robust
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aggregation rules have been proposed recently [4, 27, 2, 25, 40, 28] and can be used as a building
block for our proposed technique.
Combining input privacy and Byzantine robustness, however, has rarely been studied. The work
closest to our approach is [30] which tolerates data poisoning but does not offer Byzantine robustness,
as it still requires all workers to correctly compute aggregation weights according to the protocol. This
combination is not realistic to enforce in practice because it is hard and inefficient for servers to verify
the client-side correctness of such non-affine weights. Prio [11] is a private and robust aggregation
system relying on a different technique, called secret-shared non-interactive proofs (SNIP). While
their setting is similar to ours, the robustness they offer is limited to check the range of the input.
Besides, the encoding for SNIP has to be affine-aggregable and is expensive for clients to compute.
In this paper, we propose a secure aggregation rule with the help of two non-colluding honest-but-
curious servers. This rule also tolerates server-worker collusion. In addition, we combine robustness
and privacy to at the cost of leaking only worker similarity information which is marginal for
high-dimensional neural networks.
Main contributions. In this paper, we propose a novel distributed training protocol which is
• Privacy-preserving: our method keeps the input data of each user secure against any other
user, and against our honest-but-curious servers.
• Byzantine robust: our method offers Byzantine robustness and allows to incorporate
existing robust aggregation rules, e.g. [4, 2]. The results are exact, i.e. identical to the
non-private robust methods.
• Fault tolerant and easy to use: our method natively supports workers dropping out or
newly joining the training process. The protocol is easy to implement and to understand for
users.
• Efficient and scalable: the computation and communication overhead of our method is
negligible (less than a factor of 2) compared to non-private methods. Scalability in terms of
cost including setup and communication is linear in the number of workers.
2 Problem setup, privacy, and robustness
We consider the distributed setup of n user devices, which we call workers, with the help of two
additional servers. Each worker i has its own private part of the training dataset. The workers want to
collaboratively train a public machine learning model benefitting from the joint training data of all
participants.
In every training step, each worker computes its own private model update (for example a gradient
based on its own data) denoted by the vector xi. The aggregation protocol aims to compute the sum
z =
∑n
i=1 xi (or a robust version of this aggregation), which is then used to update a public model.
While the result z is public in all cases, the protocol must keep each xi private from any adversary or
other workers.
Security model. We consider honest-but-curious servers which do not collude with each other but
may collude with malicious workers. An honest-but-curious server follows the protocol but may try
to inspect all messages. We also assume that all communication channels are secure. We guarantee
the strong notion of input privacy, which means the servers and workers know nothing more about
each other than what can be inferred from the public output of the aggregation z.
Byzantine robustness model. We allow the standard Byzantine worker model which assumes that
workers can send arbitrary adversarial messages trying to compromise the process. We assume that a
fraction of up to α (< 0.5) of the workers is Byzantine, i.e. are malicious and not follow the protocol.
Additive secret sharing. Secret sharing is a way to split any secret into multiple parts such that no
part leaks the secret. Formally, suppose a scalar a is a secret and the secret holder shares it with k
parties through secret-shared values 〈a〉. In this paper, we only consider additive secret-sharing
where 〈a〉 is a notation for the set {ai}ki=1 which satisfy a =
∑k
p=1 ap, with ap held by party p.
Crucially, it must not be possible to reconstruct a from any ap. For vectors like x, their secret-shared
values 〈x〉 are simply component-wise scalar secret-shared values.
Two-server setting. We assume there are two non-colluding servers: model server (S1) and worker
server (S2). S1 holds the output of each aggregation and thus also the machine learning model which
is public to all workers. S2 holds intermediate values to perform Byzantine aggregation. Another
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S1 S2
(a) WorkerSecretShar-
ing: each worker i
secret-shares its update
xi locally and uploads
them to S1 and S2
separately.
S1 S2
(b) RobustWeightSelec-
tion: Compute and reveal
model distances {‖xi −
xj‖2}i<j on S2 and se-
lect a robust set of indices
represented by p = {pi}i
by calling the Byzantine-
robust oracle.
S1 S2
(c) AggregationAndUp-
date: Compute and re-
veal aggregation z =∑n
i=1 pixi on S1. S1 up-
dates the public model.
S1 S2
(d) WorkerPullModel:
Each worker i pulls
model from S1.
Figure 1: Illustration of Algorithm 2. The orange components on servers represent the computation-
intensive operations at low communication cost between servers.
key assumption is that the servers have no incentive to collude with workers, perhaps enforced via a
potential huge penalty if exposed. It is realistic to assume that the communication link between the
two servers S1 and S2 is faster than the individual links to the workers. To perform robust aggregation,
the servers will need access to a sufficient number of Beaver’s triples. These are data-independent
values required to implement secure multiplication in MPC on both servers, and can be precomputed
beforehand. For completeness, the classic algorithm for multiplication is given in in Appendix B.1.
Byzantine-robust aggregation oracles. Most of existing robust aggregation algorithms rely on
distance measures to identity potential adversarial behavior [4, 40, 25, 21, 13]. All such distance-
based aggregation rules can be directly incorporated into our proposed scheme, making them secure.
While many aforementioned papers assume that the workers have i.i.d datasets, our protocol is
oblivious to the distribution of the data across the workers. In particular, our protocol also works with
schemes such as [21, 13] designed for non-iid data.
3 Secure aggregation protocol: two-server model
Each worker first splits its private vector xi into two additive secret shares, and transmits those to
each corresponding server, ensuring that neither server can reconstruct the original vector on its own.
The two servers then execute our secure aggregation protocol. On the level of servers, the protocol is
a two-party computation (2PC). In the case of non-robust aggregation, servers simply add all shares
(we present this case in detail in Algorithm 1). In the robust case which is of our main interest here,
the two servers exactly emulate an existing Byzantine robust aggregation rule, at the cost of revealing
only distances of worker gradients on the server (the robust algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2).
Finally, the resulting aggregated output vector z is sent back to all workers and applied as the update
to the public machine learning model.
3.1 Non-robust aggregation
In each round, Algorithm 1 consists of two stages:
• WorkerSecretSharing (Figure 1a): each worker i randomly splits its private input xi into
two additive secret shares xi = x
(1)
i + x
(2)
i . This can be done e.g. by sampling a large
noise ξi and then using xi ± ξi as the shares. Worker i sends x(1)i to S1 and x(2)i to S2. We
write 〈xi〉 for the secret-shared values distributed over the two servers.
• AggregationAndUpdate (Figure 1c): Given some weights {pi}ni=1, each server locally
computes 〈∑ni=1 pixi〉. Then S2 sends its share 〈∑ni=1 pixi〉(2) to S1 so that S1 can then
compute z =
∑n
i=1 pixi. S1 updates the public model with z.
Our secure aggregation protocol is extremely simple, and as we will discuss later, has very low
communication overhead, does not require cryptographic primitives, gives strong input privacy and is
compatible with differential privacy, and is robust to worker dropouts and failures. We believe this
makes our protocol especially attractive for federated learning applications.
3
We now argue about correctness and privacy. It is clear that the output z of the above protocol satisfies
z =
∑n
i=1 pixi, ensuring that all workers compute the right update. Now we argue about the privacy
guarantees. We track the values stored by each of the servers and workers:
• S1: The secret share {x(1)i }ni=1 and the sum of other share
∑n
i=1 x
(2)
i .
• S2: The secret share {x(2)i }ni=1.• Worker i: xi and z =
∑n
i=1 pixi.
Clearly, the workers have no information other than the aggregate z and their own data. S2 only has
the secret share which on their own leak no information about any data. Hence surprisingly, S2 learns
no information in this process. S1 has its own secret share and also the sum of the other share. If
n = 1, then z = xi and hence S1 is allowed to learn everything. If n > 1, then S1 cannot recover
information about any individual secret share x(2)i from the sum. Thus, S1 learns z and nothing else.
3.2 Robust aggregation
We now describe how Algorithm 2 replaces the simple aggregation with any distance-based robust
aggregation rule such as e.g. Multi-Krum [4] which relies on computing ‖xi − xj‖2 for all i, j pairs.
The key idea is to use two-party MPC to do these computations in a secure way.
• WorkerSecretSharing (Figure 1a): As before, each worker i secret shares 〈xi〉 distributed
over the two servers S1 and S2.
• RobustWeightSelection (Figure 1b): After collecting all secret-shared values {〈xi〉}i,
the servers compute pairwise difference {〈xi − xj〉}i<j locally. S2 then reveals—to
itself exclusively—in plain text all of the pairwise Euclidean distances between workers
{‖xi − xj‖2}i<j with the help of precomputed Beaver’s triples and Algorithm 3. The
distances are kept private from S1 and workers. S2 then feeds these distances to the
distance-based robust aggregation rule (e.g. Multi-Krum), returning (on S2) a weight vector
p = {pi}ni=1 (a seleced subset indices can be converted to a vector of binary values), and
secret-sharing them with S1 for aggregation.
• AggregationAndUpdate (Figure 1c): Given weight vector p from previous step, we would
like S1 to compute
∑n
i=1 pixi. S2 secret shares with S1 the values of {〈pi〉} instead of
sending in plain-text since they may be private. Then, S1 reveals to itself, but not to S2, in
plain text the value of z =
∑n
i=1 pixi using secret-shared multiplication and updates the
public model.
• WorkerPullModel (Figure 1d): Workers pull the latest public model on S1 and update it
locally.
The key difference between the robust and the non-robust aggregation scheme is the weight selection
phase where S2 computes all pairwise distances and uses this to run a robust-aggregation rule in
a black-box manner. S2 computes these distances i) without leaking any information to S1, and
ii) without itself learning anything other than the pair-wise distances (and in particular none of the
actual values of xi). To perform such a computation, S1 and S2 use precomputed Beaver’s triplets
(Algorithm 3 in the Appendix), which can be made available in a scalable way [36].
3.3 Salient features
Overall, our protocols are very resource-light and straightforward from the perspective of the workers.
Further, since we use Byzantine-robust aggregation, our protocols are provably fault-tolerant even if a
large fraction of workers misbehave. This further lowers the requirements of a worker. In particular,
Communication overhead. We denote by t↑ the time to upload a model (or gradient) to a server,
and accordingly t↓ for the time to download from a server, and t↔ for the time to transmit data
between servers. In applications, individual uplink speed from worker and servers is typically the
main bottleneck, as it is typically much slower than downlink, and the bandwidth between servers can
be very large. For our protocols, the time spent on the uplink is within a factor of 2 of the non-secure
variants. Besides, our protocol only requires one round of communication, which is an advantage
over interactive proofs.
Fault tolerance. The workers in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are completely stateless across
multiple rounds and there is no offline phase required. This means that workers can start participating
in the protocols simply by pulling the latest public model. Further, our protocols are unaffected if
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Algorithm 1 Two-Server Secure Aggregation (Non-robust variant)
Setup: n workers (non-Byzantine) with private vectors xi. Two non-colluding servers S1 and S2.
Workers: (WorkerSecretSharing)
1. split private xi into additive secret shares 〈xi〉 = {x(1)i ,x(2)i } (such that xi = x(1)i +x(2)i )
2. send x(1)i to S1 and x
(2)
i to S2
Servers:
1. ∀ i, S1 collects x(1)i and S2 collects x(2)i
2. (AggregationAndUpdate):
(a) On S1 and S2, compute 〈∑ni=1 xi〉 locally
(b) S2 sends its share of 〈∑ni=1 xi〉 to S1
(c) S1 reveals z =
∑n
i=1 xi to everyone
Algorithm 2 Two-Server Secure Robust Aggregation (Distance-Based)
Setup: n workers, αn of which are Byzantine. Two non-colluding servers S1 and S2.
Workers: (WorkerSecretSharing)
1. split private xi into additive secret shares 〈xi〉 = {x(1)i ,x(2)i } (such that xi = x(1)i +x(2)i )
2. send x(1)i to S1 and x
(2)
i to S2
Servers:
1. ∀ i, S1 collects gradient x(1)i and S2 collects x(2)i
2. (RobustWeightSelection):
(a) For each pair (xi, xj) compute their Euclidean distance (i < j):
• On S1 and S2, compute 〈xi − xj〉 = 〈xi〉 − 〈xj〉 locally
• Use precomputed Beaver’s triples (see Algorithm 3) to compute the
distance ‖xi − xj‖2
(b) S2 perform robust aggregation rule p =MultiKrum({‖xi − xj‖2}i<j)
(c) S2 secret-shares 〈p〉 with S1
3. (AggregationAndUpdate):
(a) On S1 and S2, use MPC multiplication to compute 〈∑ni=1 pixi〉 locally
(b) S2 sends its share of 〈∑ni=1 pixi〉(2) to S1
(c) S1 reveals z =
∑n
i=1 pixi to all workers.
Workers:
1. (WorkerPullModel): Collect z and update model locally
some workers drop out in the middle of a round. Unlike in [7], there is no entanglement between
workers and we don’t face unbounded recovery issues.
Compatibility with local differential privacy. One byproduct of our protocol can be used to convert
differentially private mechanisms, such as [1] which only of the aggregate model which guarantees
privacy, into the stronger locally differentially private mechanisms which guarantee user-level privacy.
Other Byzantine-robust oracles. We can also use some robust-aggregation rules which are not
based on pair-wise distances such as Byzantine SGD [2]. Since the basic structures are very similar
to Algorithm 2, we put Algorithm 5 in the appendix.
Security. The security of Algorithm 1 is straightforward as we previously discussed. The security of
Algorithm 2 again relies on the separation of information between S1 and S2 with neither the workers
nor S1 learning anything other than the aggregate z. We will next formally prove that this is true
even in the presence of malicious workers.
4 Theoretical guarantees
4.1 Exactness
In the following lemma we show that Algorithm 2 gives the exact same result as non-privacy-
preserving version.
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Lemma 1 (Exactness of Algorithm 2). The resulting z in Algorithm 2 is identical to the output of
the non-privacy-preserving version of the used robust aggregation rule.
Proof. After secret-sharing xi to 〈xi〉 to two servers, Algorithm 2 performs local differences {〈xi −
xj〉}i<j . Using shared-values multiplication via Beaver’s triple, S2 obtains the list of true Euclidean
distances {‖xi − xj‖2}i<j . The result is fed to a distance-based robust aggregation rule oracle, all
solely on S2. Therefore, the resulting indices {pi}i as used in z := Σni=1pixi are identical to the
aggregation of non-privacy-preserving robust aggregation.
With the exactness of the protocol established, we next focus on the privacy guarantee.
4.2 Privacy
We prove probabilistic (information-theoretic) notions of privacy which gives the strongest guarantee
possible. Formally, we will aim to show that the distribution of the secret does not change even after
being conditioned on all observations made by all participants, i.e. each worker i, S1 and S2. This
implies that the observations carry absolutely no information about the secret. Our results rely on the
existence of simple additive secret-sharing protocols as discussed in the Appendix.
Each worker i only receives the final aggregated z at the end of the protocol and is not involved in
any other manner. Hence no information can be leaked to them. We will now examine S1. The proofs
below rely on Beaver’s triples which we summarize in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Beaver’s triples). Suppose we secret share 〈x〉 and 〈y〉 between S1 and S2 and want to
compute xy on S2. There exists a protocol which enables such computation which uses precomputed
shares BV = (〈a〉, 〈b〉, 〈c〉) such that S1 does not learn anything and S2 only learns xy.
Due to the page limit, we put the details about Beaver’s triples, multiplying secret shares, as well as
the proofs for the next two theorems to the Appendix.
Theorem I (Privacy for S1). Let z =
∑n
i=1 pixi where {pi}ni=1 is the output of byzantine oracle
or a vetor of 1s (non-private). Let BVij = 〈aij , bij , cij〉 and BV pi = 〈api , bpi , cpi 〉 be the Beaver’s
triple used in the multiplications. Let 〈·〉(1) be the share of the secret-shared values 〈·〉 on S1. Then
for all workers i
P(xi = xi | {〈xi〉(1), 〈pi〉(1)}ni=1, {BV (1)i,j ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j ,
{〈‖xi − xj‖2〉(1)}i<j , {BV p(1)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1, z) = P(xi = xi|z)
Note that the conditioned values are what S1 observes throughout the algorithm. {BV (1)ij ,xi −xj −
aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j and {BV p(1)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1 are intermediate values during shared
values multiplication.
For S2, the theorem to prove is a bit different because in this case S2 doesn’t know the output of
aggregation z. In fact, this is more similar to an independent system which knows little about the
underlying tasks, model weights, etc. We show that while S2 has observed many intermediate values,
it can only learn no more than what can be inferred from model distances.
Theorem II (Privacy for S2). Let {pi}ni=1 is the output of byzantine oracle or a vetor of 1s (non-
private). Let BVij = 〈aij , bij , cij〉 and BV pi = 〈api , bpi , cpi 〉 be the Beaver’s triple used in the
multiplications. Let 〈·〉(1) be the share of the secret-shared values 〈·〉 on S2. Then for all workers i
P(xi = xi | {〈xi〉(2), 〈pi〉(2), pi}ni=1, {BV (2)i,j ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j ,
{〈‖xi − xj‖2〉(2), ‖xi − xj‖2}i<j , {BV p(2)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1)
= P(xi = xi | {‖xi − xj‖2}i<j)
(1)
Note that the conditioned values are what S1 observed throughout the algorithm. {BV (2)ij ,xi−xj −
aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j and {BV p(2)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1 are intermediate values during shared
values multiplication.
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The model distances indeed only leaks similarity among the workers. Such similarity, however, does
not tell S2 information about the parameters; in [25] the leeway attack attacks distance based-rules
because they don’t distinguish two gradients with evenly distributed noise and two different gradients
very different in one parameter. This means the leaked information has low impact to the privacy.
It is also worth noting that curious workers can only inspect others’ values by learning from the
public model/update. This is because in our scheme, workers don’t interact directly and there is only
one round of communication between servers and workers. So the only message a worker receives is
the public model update.
4.3 Combining with differential privacy
While input privacy is our main goal, our approach is naturally compatible with other orthogonal
notions of privacy. Global differential privacy (DP) [35, 1, 8] is mainly concerned about the privacy
of the aggregated model, and whether it leaks information about the training data. On the other
hand, local differential privacy (LDP) [12, 18] is stronger notions which is also concerned with the
training process itself. It requires that every communication transmitted by the worker does not leak
information about their data. In general, it is hard to learn deep learning models satisfying LDP using
iterate perturbation (which is the standard mechanism for DP) [7].
Our non-robust protocol is naturally compatible with local differential privacy. Consider the usual
iterative optimization algorithm which in each round t performs
pt ← pt−1 − η(xt + νt) , where xt = 1n
∑n
i=1 xt,i . (2)
Here xt is the aggregate update, pt is the model parameters, and νt is the noise added for DP [1].
Theorem III (from DP to LDP). Suppose that the noise νt in (2) is sufficient to ensure that the set
of model parameters {pt}t∈[T ] satisfy (ε, δ)-DP for ε ≥ 1. Then, running (2) with using Alg. 1 to
compute (xt + ηt) by securely aggregating {x1,t + nηt,x2,t, . . . ,xn,t} satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP.
Unlike existing approaches, we do not face a tension between differential privacy which relies on
real-valued vectors and cryptographic tools which operate solely on discrete/quantized objects. This
is because our protocols do not rely on any cryptographic primitives, in contrast to e.g. [7]. In
particular, the vectors xi can be full-precision (real-valued), and do not need to be quantized. Thus,
our secure aggregation protocol can be integrated with a mechanism which has global DP properties
e.g. [1], and prove local DP guarantees for the resulting mechanism.
5 Empirical analysis of overhead
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Figure 2: Left: Actual time spent; Right: Time
adjusted for network bandwidth.
We present an illustrative simulation on a local
machine (i7-8565U) to demonstrate the over-
head of our scheme. We use PyTorch with
MPI to train a neural network of 1.2 million
parameters on the MNIST dataset. We compare
the following three settings: simple aggregation
with 1 server, secure aggregation with 2 servers,
robust secure aggregation with 2 servers (with
Krum [4]). The number of workers is always 5.
Figure 2 shows the time spent on all parts of
training for one aggregation step. Tgrad is the
time spent on batch gradient computation; Tw2s
refers to the time spend on uploading and down-
loading gradients; Ts2s is the time spend on
communication between servers. Note that the
server-to-server communication could be further
reduced by employing more efficient aggregation rules. Since the simulation is run on a local machine,
time spent on communication is underestimated. In the right hand side figure, we adjusts time by
assuming the worker-to-server link has 100Mbps bandwidth and 1Gbps respectively for the server-to-
server link. Even in this scenario, we can see that the overhead from private aggregation is small.
Furthermore, the additional overhead by the robustness module is moderate comparing to the standard
training, even for realistic deep-learning settings. For comparison, a zero-knowledge-proof-based
approach need to spend 0.03 seconds to encode a submission of 100 integers [11].
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6 Literature review
Secure Aggregation. In the standard distributed setting with 1 server, [7] proposes a secure aggrega-
tion rule which is also fault tolerant. They generate a shared secret key for each pair of users. The
secret keys are used to construct masks to the input gradients so that masks cancel each other after
aggregation. To achieve fault tolerance, they employ Shamir’s secret sharing. To deal with active
adversaries, they use a public key infrastructure (PKI) as well as a second mask applied to the input.
A followup work [23] minimizes the pairwise communication by outsourcing the key generation
to two non-colluding cryptographic secret providers. However, both protocols are still not scalable
because each worker needs to compute a shared-secret key and a noise mask for every other client.
When recovering from failures, all live clients need to be notified and send their corresponding masks
to the server, which introduces significant extra communications. In contrast, workers in our scheme
are freed from coordinating with other workers, which leads to a more scalable system.
Byzantine-Robust Aggregation/SGD. [4] first proposes Krum and Multi-Krum for training machine
learning models in the presence of Byzantine workers. [25] proposes a general enhancement recipe
for Byzantine-resilient rules, termed Bulyan, to defend poisoning attacks. [2] proves a robust SGD
training scheme with optimal sample complexity and the number of SGD computations. [28] uses
HMM to detect and exclude Byzantine workers for federated learning. [40] proposes median and
trimmed-mean -based Byzantine robust algorithms which achieve optimal statistical performance.
Many of the aforementioned papers require i.i.d. datasets. Byzantine robust rules for non-i.i.d
dataset have appeared only recently [21, 13]. Further, [37] extends the Byzantine setting to attackers
manipulating data transfer between workers and server and [38] extends it to tolerate an arbitrary
number of Byzantine workers.
[30] proposes a robust aggregation rule RFA which is also privacy-preserving. However, it is only
robust to the noise in the dataset but not Byzantine-tolerant because it relies on workers to compute
aggregation weights according to the protocol. [11] proposes a private and robust aggregation system
(Prio) based on secret-shared non-interactive proof (SNIP). Similar to our settings, the clients’ secret
share their input and send them the servers for aggregation. In fact, each client sends input shares
along with a SNIP proof which will be used by servers to validate the submission. However, the
generation of a SNIP proof on client is expansive and the cost increases with the dimension of vectors
submitted. Besides, the robustness in this paper is limited to validating the range of the data, e.g.
validate that input for a binary value should be 0 or 1. But it does not work if malicious clients
misreport their private data.
Inference As A Service. An orthogonal line of work is inference as a service or oblivious inference. A
user encrypts its own data and uploads it to the server for inference. [14, 33, 15, 22, 26, 33, 10, 16, 32]
falls into a general category of 2-party computation (2PC). A number of issues have to be taken into
account: the non-linear activations should be replaced with MPC-friendly activations, represent the
floating number as integers. [34] uses functional encryption on polynomial networks. [14] also have
to adapt activations to polynomial activations and max pooling to scaled mean pooling.
Server-Aided MPC. One common setting for training machine learning model with MPC is the
server-aided case [26, 9]. In previous works, both the model weights and the data are stored in shared
values, which in turn makes the inference process computationally very costly. Another issue is that
only a limited number of operations (function evaluations) are supported by shared values. Therefore,
approximating non-linear activation functions again introduces significant overhead. In our paper, the
computation of gradients are local to the workers, only output gradients are sent to the servers. Thus
no adaptations of the worker’s neural network architectures for MPC are required.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel secure and Byzantine-robust aggregation rule. To our knowledge,
this is the first work to address these two key properties jointly. Our algorithm is simple and fault
tolerant and scales well with the number of workers. The protocol is based on two non-colluding
honest-but-curious auxiliary servers. In addition, the Byzantine-robust aggregation rule used internally
can be replaced by any existing distance-based robust rule. The communication overhead of our
algorithm is roughly bounded by a factor of 2. The computation overhead, as shown in Algorithm 3,
is simply the cost of a few linear operations which is marginal. No computational overhead is incurred
on the workers.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Theorem I (Privacy for S1). Let z =
∑n
i=1 pixi where {pi}ni=1 is the output of byzantine oracle
or a vetor of 1s (non-private). Let BVij = 〈aij , bij , cij〉 and BV pi = 〈api , bpi , cpi 〉 be the Beaver’s
triple used in the multiplications. Let 〈·〉(1) be the share of the secret-shared values 〈·〉 on S1. Then
for all workers i
P(xi = xi | {〈xi〉(1), 〈pi〉(1)}ni=1, {BV (1)i,j ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j ,
{〈‖xi − xj‖2〉(1)}i<j , {BV p(1)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1, z) = P(xi = xi|z)
Note that the conditioned values are what S1 observes throughout the algorithm. {BV (1)ij ,xi −xj −
aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j and {BV p(1)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1 are intermediate values during shared
values multiplication.
Proof. First, we use the independence of Beaver’s triple to simplify the conditioned term.
• The Beaver’s triples are data-independent. Since 〈api 〉(2) and 〈bpi 〉(2) only exist in {pi −
api , pi − bpi }i and they are independent of all other variables, we can remove {pi − api , pi −
bpi }i from conditioned terms.
• For the same reason {BV p(1)i }ni=1 are independent of all other variables and can be removed.
• The secret shares of aggregation weights 〈pi〉(1) := (pi + ηi)/2 and 〈pi〉(2) := (pi − ηi)/2
where ηi is random noise. Then {〈pi〉(1)}i are independent of all other variables. Thus it
can be removed.
Now the left hand side (LHS) can be simplified as
LHS =P(xi = xi|{〈xi〉(1)}ni=1,
{BV (1)i,j ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij ,
〈‖xi − xj‖2〉(1)}i<j , z)
(3)
There are other independence properties:
• The secret shares of the input 〈xi〉 can be seen as generated by random noise ξi. Thus
〈xi〉(1) := (ξi + xi)/2 and 〈xi〉(2) := (−ξi + xi)/2 are independent of others like xi.
Besides, for all j 6= i, 〈xi〉(·) and 〈xj〉(·) are independent.
• Beaver’s triple {BV (1)i,j }i<j and {BV (2)i,j }i<j are clearly independent. Since they are gener-
ated before the existance of data, they are always independent of {x(·)j }j .
Next, according to Beaver’s multiplication Algorithm 3,
〈‖xi − xj‖2〉(1) = c(1)ij + (xi − xj − aij)b(1)ij + (xi − xj − bij)a(1)ij
we can remove this term from condition:
LHS = P(xi = xi|{〈xi〉(1)}ni=1, z,
{BV (1)i,j ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j)
(4)
By the independence between 〈xi〉(·) and BV (·)ij , we can further simplify the conditioned term
LHS = P(xi = xi|{〈xi〉(1)}ni=1, z,
{BV (1)i,j , 〈xi − xj − aij〉(2), 〈xi − xj − bij〉(2)}i<j)
(5)
Since BV (1)ij and BV
(2)
ij are always independent of all other variables, we know that
LHS = P(xi = xi|{〈xi〉(1)}ni=1, z) (6)
For worker i, ∀j 6= i, 〈xi〉(·) and 〈xj〉(1) are independent
LHS = P(xi = xi|z).
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Theorem II (Privacy for S2). Let {pi}ni=1 is the output of byzantine oracle or a vetor of 1s (non-
private). Let BVij = 〈aij , bij , cij〉 and BV pi = 〈api , bpi , cpi 〉 be the Beaver’s triple used in the
multiplications. Let 〈·〉(1) be the share of the secret-shared values 〈·〉 on S2. Then for all workers i
P(xi = xi | {〈xi〉(2), 〈pi〉(2), pi}ni=1, {BV (2)i,j ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j ,
{〈‖xi − xj‖2〉(2), ‖xi − xj‖2}i<j , {BV p(2)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1)
= P(xi = xi | {‖xi − xj‖2}i<j)
(1)
Note that the conditioned values are what S1 observed throughout the algorithm. {BV (2)ij ,xi−xj −
aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j and {BV p(2)i , pi − api , pi − bpi }ni=1 are intermediate values during shared
values multiplication.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem I, we can first conclude
• {pi − api , pi − bpi }i and {BV p(2)i }ni=1 could be dropped because these they are data inde-
pendent and no other terms depend on them.
• {〈pi〉(2)}ni=1 is independent of the others so it can be dropped.• {pi}ni=1 can be inferred from {‖xi − xj‖2}ij so it can also be dropped.
• By the definition of {〈‖xi−xj‖2〉(2)}ij , it can be represented by {xi}(2) and {BV (2)ij ,xi−
xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij}i<j .
Now the left hand side (LHS) can be simplified as
LHS =P(xi = xi|{〈xi〉(2)}ni=1,
{BV (2)ij ,xi − xj − aij ,xi − xj − bij ,
‖xi − xj‖2}i<j)
(7)
Because xi is independent of {〈xi〉(2)}ni=1 as well as data independent terms like
{BV (2)ij ,a(1)ij , b(1)ij }i<j , we have
LHS = P(xi = xi
∣∣ ‖xi − xj‖2}i<j)
Theorem III (from DP to LDP). Suppose that the noise νt in (2) is sufficient to ensure that the set
of model parameters {pt}t∈[T ] satisfy (ε, δ)-DP for ε ≥ 1. Then, running (2) with using Alg. 1 to
compute (xt + ηt) by securely aggregating {x1,t + nηt,x2,t, . . . ,xn,t} satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP.
Proof. Suppose that worker i ∈ [n] copmutes it gradient xi based on data di ∈ D. For the sake of
simplicity, let us assume that the arregate model satisfies ε-DP. The proof is identical for the more
relaxed notion of (ε, δ)-DP fo rε ≥ 1. This implies that for any j ∈ [n] and dj , d˜j ∈ D,
Pr
[
1
n (
∑n
i=1 xi(di)) + ν = y
]
Pr
[
1
n (
∑
i6=j xi(di)) +
1
nxj(d˜j) + ν = y
] ≤ ε ,∀y . (8)
Now, we examine the communication received by each server and measure how much information is
revealed about any given worker j ∈ [n]. The values stored and seen are:
• S1: The secret share (x1 + nν)(1), {xi(di)(1)}ni=2 and the sum of other shares (x1 +
nν)(2) +
∑n
i=2 xi(di)
(2) = ((
∑n
i=1 xi(di)) + nν)
(2).
• S2: The secret share (x1 + nν)(2), {xi(di)(2)}ni=2.• Worker i: z = (∑ni=1 xi(di)) + nν.
The equality above is because our secret shares are linear. Now, the values seen by any worker satisfy
ε-LDP directly by (8). For the server, note that by the definition of our secret shares, we have for any
worker j,
xj(dj)
(1) is independent of xj(dj)
⇒Pr[xj(dj)(1) = y] = Pr[xj(dj)(1) = y˜] ,∀y, y˜
⇒Pr[xj(dj)(1) = y] = Pr[xj(d˜j)(1) = y] ,∀dj , d˜j ∈ D .
A similar statement holds for the second share. This proves that the values computed/seen by the
workers or servers satisfy ε-LDP.
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B Notes on security
B.1 Beaver’s MPC Protocol
Algorithm 3 [3]’s MPC Protocol
input: 〈x〉; 〈y〉; Beaver’s triple (〈a〉, 〈b〉, 〈c〉) s.t. c = ab
output: 〈z〉 s.t. z = xy
for all party i do
locally compute xi − ai and yi − bi and then broadcast them to all parties
collect all shares and reveal x− a = Σi(xi − ai), y − b = Σi(yi − bi)
compute zi := ci + (x− a)bi + (y − b)ai
end for
The first party 1 updates z1 := z1 + (x− a)(y − b)
In this section, we briefly introduce [3]’s classic implementations of addition 〈x+y〉 and multplication
〈xy〉 given additive secret-shared values 〈x〉 and 〈y〉 where each party i holding xi and yi. The
algorithm for multiplication is given in Algorithm 3.
Addition. The secret-shared values form of sum, 〈x+ y〉, is obtained by simply each party i locally
compute xi + yi.
Multiplication. Assume we already have three secret-shared values called a triple, 〈a〉, 〈b〉, and 〈c〉
such that c = ab.
Then note that if each party broadcasts xi − ai and yi − bi, then each party i can compute x− a and
y − b (so these values are publicly known), and hence compute
zi := ci + (x− a)bi + (y − b)ai
Additionally, one party (chosen arbitrarily) adds on the public value (x− a)(y − b) to their share so
that summing all the shares up, the parties get
Σizi = c+ (x− a)b+ (y − b)a+ (x− a)(y − b) = xy
and so they have a secret sharing 〈z〉 of xy.
The generation of Beaver’s triples. There are many different implementations of the offline phase
of the MPC multiplication. For example, semi-homomorphic encryption based implementations [20]
or oblivious transfer-based implementations [19]. Since their security and performance have been
demonstrated, we may assume the Beaver’s triples are ready for use at the initial step of our protocol.
B.2 Notes on obtaining a secret share
Suppose that we want to secret share a bounded real vector x ∈ (−B,B]d for some B ≥ 0. Then, we
sample a random vector ξ uniformly from (−B,B]d. This is easily done by sampling each coordinate
independently from (−B,B]. Then the secret shares become (ξ,x − ξ). Since ξ is drawn from a
uniform distribution from [−B,B]d, the distribution of x− ξ conditioned on x is still uniform over
(−B,B]d and (importantly) independent of x. All arithmetic operations are then carried out modulo
[−B,B] i.e. B + 1 ≡ −B + 1 and −B − 1 ≡ B − 1. This simple scheme ensures information
theoretic input-privacy for continuous vectors.
The scheme described above requires access to true randomness i.e. the ability to sample uniformly
from (−B,B]. We make this assumption to simplify the proofs and the presentation. We note that
differential privacy techniques such as [1] also assume access to a similar source of true randomness.
In practice, however, this would be replaced with a pseudo-random-generator (PRG) [5, 39].
B.3 Computational indistinguishability
Let {Xn}, {Yn} be sequences of distributions indexed by a security parameter n (like the length of
the input). {Xn} and {Yn} are computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial-time A and
polynomially-bounded ε, and sufficiently large n∣∣Pr[A(Xn) = 1]− Pr[A(Yn) = 1]∣∣ ≤ ε(n) (9)
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If a pseudorandom generator, instead of true randomness, is used in Appendix B.2 , then the shares
are indistinguishable from a uniform distribution over a field of same length. Thus in Theorem I
and Theorem II, the secret shares can be replaced by an independent random variable of uniform
distribution with negligible change in probability.
B.4 Notes on the security of S2
Theorem II proves that S2 does not learn anything besides the pairwise distances between the various
models. While this does leak some information about the models, S2 cannot use this information to
reconstruct any xi. This is because the pair-wise distances are invariant to translations, rotations, and
shuffling of the coordinates of {xi}.
This remains true even if S2 additionally learns the global model too.
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C Example: Two-server protocol with ByzantineSGD oracle
We can replace MultiKrum with ByzantineSGD in [2]. To fit into our protocol, we make some minor
modifications but still guarantee that output is same. The core part of [2] is listed in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 ByzantineSGD [2]
input: I is the set of good workers, {Ai}i∈[m], {‖Bi−Bj‖}i<j {‖∇k,i−∇k,j‖}i<j (i, j ∈ [m]),
thresholds TA,TB > 0
output: Subset good workers S
Amed := median{A1, . . . , Am};
Bmed ← Bi where i ∈ [m] is any machine s.t. |{j ∈ [m] : ‖Bj −Bi‖ ≤ TB}| > m/2;
∇med ← ∇k,i where i ∈ [m] is any machine s.t. |{j ∈ [m] : ‖∇k,j −∇k,i‖ ≤ 2ν}| > m/2;
S ← {i ∈ I : |Ai −Amed| ≤ TA ∧ ‖Bi −Bmed‖ ≤ TB ∧ ‖∇k,j −∇k,i‖ ≤ 4ν};
The main algorithm can be summarized in Algorithm 5, the red lines highlights the changes. Different
from Multi-KRUM [4], [2] uses states in their algorithm. As a result, the servers need to keep track
of such states.
Algorithm 5 Two-Server Secure ByzantineSGD
Setup:
• n workers, at most α percent of which are Byzantine.
• Two non-colluding servers S1 and S2
• ByzantineSGD Oracle: returns an indices set S.
– With thresholds TA and TB
– Oracle state Aoldi , 〈Boldi 〉 for each worker i
Workers:
1. (WorkerSecretSharing):
(a) randomly split private xi into additive secret shares 〈xi〉 = {x(1)i ,x(2)i } (such
that xi = x
(1)
i + x
(2)
i )
(b) sends x(1)i to S1 and x
(2)
i to S2
Servers:
1. ∀ i, S1 collects gradient x(1)i and S2 collects x(2)i .
(a) Use Beaver’s triple to compute Ai := 〈〈xi〉, 〈w −w0〉〉inner +Aoldi
(b) 〈Bi〉 := 〈xi〉+ 〈Boldi 〉
2. (RobustSubsetSelection):
(a) For each pair (i, j) of gradients computes their distance (i < j):
• On S1 and S2, compute 〈Bi −Bj〉 = 〈Bi〉 − 〈Bj〉 locally
• Use precomputed Beaver’s triple and Algorithm 3 to compute the
distance ‖Bi −Bj‖2
• On S1 and S2, compute 〈xi − xj〉 = 〈xi〉 − 〈xj〉 locally
• Use precomputed Beaver’s triple and Algorithm 3 to compute the
distance ‖xi − xj‖22
(b) S2 perform Byzantine SGD S=ByzantineSGD({Ai}i, {‖Bi−Bj‖}i<j , {‖xi−
xj‖}i<j ,TA,TB); if |S| < 2, exit; Convert S to a weight vector p of length n
(c) S2 secret-shares 〈p〉 with S1
3. (AggregationAndUpdate):
(a) On S1 and S2, use MPC multiplication to compute 〈∑ni=1 pixi〉 locally
(b) S2 sends its share of 〈∑ni=1 pixi〉(2) to S1
(c) S1 reveals z =
∑n
i=1 pixi to all workers.
(d) S2 updates Aoldi ← Ai, 〈Boldi 〉 ← 〈Bi〉
Workers:
1. (WorkerPullModel): Collect z and update model w ← w + z locally
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Get Beaver’s triples: {〈aij , bij , cij〉(1)}i<j
{〈xi − xj − aij〉(1), 〈xi − xj − bij〉(1)}i<j
{〈xi − xj − aij〉(2), 〈xi − xj − bij〉(2)}i<j
Get Beaver’s triples: {〈aij , bij , cij〉(2)}i<j
Compute {〈‖xi − xj‖22〉(1)}i<j Compute {〈‖xi − xj‖22〉(2)}i<j
{〈‖xi − xj‖22〉(1)}i<j
Compute {‖xi − xj‖22}i<j
Call p =Multi-KRUM({‖xi − xj‖22}i<j)
pi = p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i
{〈pi〉(1)}ni=1
Get Beaver’s triples: {〈api , bpi , cpi 〉(1)}ni=1 Get Beaver’s triples: {〈api , bpi , cpi 〉(2)}ni=1
{〈pi − api 〉(1), 〈xi − bpi 〉(1)}ni=1
{〈pi − api 〉(2), 〈xi − bpi 〉(2)}ni=1
Compute 〈Σni=1pixi〉(1) Compute 〈Σni=1pixi〉(2)
〈Σni=1pixi〉(2)
Compute z = Σni=1pixi
z
Figure 3: Overview of data ownership and Algorithm 1. The underlying Byzantine-robust oracle is
Multi-KRUM.
In Figure 3, we show a diagram of data ownership to demonstrate of the data transmitted among
workers and servers. Note that the Beaver’s triples are already local to each server so that no extra
communication is needed.
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